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Policymaking Network of the Iron-Triangle Subgovernment
for Licensing Hazardous Waste Facilities
F. Gregory Hayden
The purposes here are to explain the linkage of (1) economic methodology, (2) corporate
networks, and (3) federal court decisions in the licensing of hazardous waste facilities and
to recognize the opportunity the combination of the three provides for institutional
economists.1 The United States has the best and most comprehensive set of laws we
might expect from a legislative process in order to prevent human disease, loss of prop-
erty, and ecological system destruction from hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste. Yet
the licensing process and assessment that has grown out of that legislation has not pro-
duced the protection expected. The waste disposal problem continues to grow.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 is another achievement of
the “Greatest Generation.”2 It was the world’s first environmental policy of such pro-
portion, and it became a model for environmental policies and legislation in nations
around the globe for protecting the environment (see Colombo 1992). Consistent with
institutionalism, NEPA has been called “an organic act for environmental protection”
(Ringquist 1999, 88). The approximately 50,000 NEPA environmental assessments pre-
pared annually are an indication that the influence NEPA is to have on comprehensive
planning is intended to be pervasive.
The principal tools of NEPA for assessing impacts and planning actions are the
environmental impact assessment (EIA) and the environmental impact statement (EIS).
The purpose of the EIA is to ensure that appropriate attention is given to environmen-
tal issues. It is to provide adequate information on projects such as waste disposal pro-
jects that affect the environment. “All environmentally relevant impacts of such
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activities should be identified, analyzed and evaluated before consent is given”
(Colombo 1992, 1). In addition to analytical information, the EIA includes scoping,
consultation of other authorities, and public participation. An EIS is prepared to inves-
tigate environmental consequences of alternatives for pursuing a proposed project and
must be used by decision makers in reaching a final decision. The EIS is to include the
environmental impact of the proposed action, any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided, and any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which might be involved in the proposed action (Eccleston 2001, 9).
Economists Have Failed to Provide a NEPA Welfare Paradigm
Although legislators have provided an appropriate legal apparatus for evaluation,
waste production and disposal problems continue to grow. This is due in part to the fail-
ure of economics to provide a welfare paradigm that is relevant, reasonable, and applica-
ble. NEPA expresses a holistic and organic concern about general welfare. Economists
are expected to provide for welfare analysis and efficiency measures, but an acceptable
paradigm does not exist. Neoclassical cost-benefit analysis has been rejected for NEPA
assessments for all the reasons that institutionalists have rejected it. It is now “settled
that NEPA does not require a cost-benefit analysis . . .” (Anderson et al. 1999, 284).
The court seriously questioned the basis for neoclassical analysis where it ruled that
“natural resources have value that is not readily measured by traditional means” (Ohio v.
Interior 1989, 785). The traditional means of concern in neoclassical cost-benefit analy-
sis is market price, about which the court stated, “it is unreasonable to view market price
as the exclusive factor, or even the predominant one. . . . [N]atural resources have values
that are not fully captured by the market system” (Ohio v. Interior 1989, 486). Thus, the
court found that the Department of Interior “erred by establishing a strong presump-
tion in favor of market price and appraisal methodologies” (Ohio v. Interior 1989, 786).
Other schools of economics have failed to provide alternative methodologies. How is a
reviewing agency to integrate and balance the volumes of analysis and information from
experts in geology, economics, biology, hydrogeology, engineering, and physics? Econo-
mists have not provided acceptable standards, criteria, analytical methodologies, or pro-
cedures for completing such analysis. The theoretical divisions in economics make it
impossible for decision makers and courts to select a set of theories and consequent cri-
teria upon which to make decisions. Economists are to provide assistance in knowing
goods and services from bads and disservices and to provide guidance about how to
determine what is efficient. “Efficient” means producing a desired effect. Yet, agencies
and courts have not found evaluation tools or standards in economics that are sufficient
for real-world application. As the court stated in Ohio v. Interior, efficiency means “the
result that achieves the greatest value to society. Whether a particular choice is efficient
depends on how the various alternatives are valued” (1989, 473). Economists have pro-
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vided little viable assistance with regard to how to select alternatives according to soci-
etal beliefs and values.3
The failure of economists has been to the benefit of powerful corporations, who
have dominated many licensing decisions through subgovernment networks and
through their ability to hire expertise.
The Iron-Triangle Subgovernment Model
James Swaney has explained that the corporate elite controls hazardous technolo-
gies, that information about the technologies is often shielded from public scrutiny, and
that, consequently, the elite possesses the power to impose risks on an uninformed,
unsuspecting public (Swaney 1995, 578). The reason the public is so uninformed and
unsuspecting is because of the power gained over the information and analysis process
by what political scientists have termed “iron triangles,” or “subgovernments.” The
subgovernment explanation to policymaking is based on the reality that small groups of
actors dominate certain sectors of the political system. Subgovernmental groups that
compose the three sides of the iron triangle consist of (1) government bureaucrats in
executive positions, (2) a legislative committee or commission to which the legislative
process delegated authority, and (3) an integrated corporate interest group. The partici-
pants organize into mutually reinforcing relationships between regulated interests and
regulators. In the case of hazardous waste, the corporations dominate the decision pro-
cess about the definition of the problem and are the entity that completes much of the
analysis and data collection.
An example of an integrated corporate network, taken from the database of
another article, is illustrated in figure 1 (Hayden, Wood, and Kaya 2002). The twelve
corporations in figure 1 are the most dominant corporations among seventy-two corpo-
rations that make up the integrated network surrounding a subgovernment of a
multi-state compact organized to site a radioactive waste disposal facility. The basic mea-
surement unit is the “power bloc,” which is a set of corporations integrated by interlock-
ing boards of directors, as follows: Peter Kiewit & Sons’<=>Berkshire Hathaway<=>
CalEnergy<=>Illinois Power. This is an example of four global corporations with com-
mon energy interests who produce hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste. The directed
lines between the corporations represent the exchange of one or more directors between
corporations. The combination of the four corporations is one power bloc.
Some examples of power bloc involvement among the twelve well-known global
corporations in figure 1 are
• Berkshire Hathaway is a member of 421 different power blocs among the
seventy-two corporations.
• Peter Kiewit & Sons’ is a member of 489 different power blocs.
• Entergy is a member of 319.
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• CalEnergy participates in 570.
• Illinois Power is a member of 555 different overlapping power blocs.
As displayed in figure 1, among the twelve most dominant corporations, every corpora-
tion is involved in power blocs with every other corporation. Connecting lines in figure 1
represent, on the average, eighty-five different power blocs to which the two corporations
share membership among the power blocs of the seventy-two corporations (Hayden,
Wood, and Kaya 2002). The integrated policy coordination of such a dense network
makes for excessive corporate power in any subgovernment arrangement. Thus, the cor-
porations can dominate the EIS and EIA process to arrive at conclusions to approve their
projects. If public groups disagree with an agency’s approval, the decision must be
appealed in the courts after the fact.
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Figure 1. Power Bloc Connections Among the Twelve Most Dominant
Subgovernment Corporations
Note: A “power bloc” is a set of four corporations that are linearly connected by interlocking directorships. Average number of
different power blocs represented by each line that connects two corporations is eighty-five.
Federal Court Review of Agency Decisions
Although federal courts have ruled that they can review an agency’s compliance with
the applicable laws and regulations, this does not necessarily mean that the courts can
reverse the substantive decision made by the agency. Federal courts have focused on the
extent to which they should defer to the discretionary decision making of the agency.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (1971, 837), the US Supreme Court
applied the “arbitrary and capricious” standard to an agency decision made under
NEPA on whether or not to prepare an EIS. The Supreme Court has indicated that this
standard may also apply to other agency actions taken under NEPA. The Court then
held that the “generally applicable” standards of the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act require the “reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry” (Marsh v. Oregon
1989, 360). This statement led some courts to adopt what has come to be known as the
“hard look” doctrine in reviewing agency decisions.
Judge Leventhal of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was the first to
espouse the hard look doctrine. He explained: “Its supervisory function calls on the
court to intervene not merely in the case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing the
mandate in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, espe-
cially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a hard
look at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-mak-
ing” (Greater Boston v. Federal Communications Commission 1972, 950). In other words,
the court must take a hard look to ensure that the agency has taken a hard look:
“[A]ssumptions must be spelled out, inconsistencies explained, methodologies dis-
closed, contradictory evidence rebutted, record references solidly grounded, guesswork
eliminated and conclusions supported in a ‘manner capable of judicial understanding’”
(E. I. duPont v. Train 1977, 1038).
The hard look test has also been adopted by the Fifth Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals in the context of reviewing the adequacy of an EIS (Isle of Hope, etc. v.
U.S. Army Corps 1981, 220). The US Supreme Court has reviewed the doctrine on sev-
eral occasions since its adoption, and although it has given conflicting signals as to its
vitality, the doctrine continues to be valid (Chevron v. Natural Resources 1984, 837).
Economists have not assisted the courts by providing analytical tools for a hard look.
Even in the face of the hard look doctrine, courts consider their role in reviewing
agency decisions to be limited. Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court’s
review is narrow, and the agency needs only to articulate a rational connection between
the facts found and the conclusions made (ONRC v. Lowe 1997, 521). And, more impor-
tantly, the US Supreme Court has concluded that a court cannot overturn an agency’s
substantive decision on the merits if it has not complied with NEPA. “The only role for
a court is to insure that the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental conse-
quences; it cannot interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the
choice of the action to be taken” (Kleppe v. Sierra Club 1972, 411n.2). In a later case, the
Court stated in dicta: “NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation,
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but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural . . . . It is to insure a fully
informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a decision . . . this Court would
have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency. Admin-
istrative decisions should be set aside in this context . . . only for substantial procedural
or substantive reasons as mandated by statute, . . . not simply because the court is
unhappy with the result reached” (Vermont Yankee v. Natural Resources 1978, 558). In
Strycker’s Bay v. Karlen, the district court ruled that HUD was not required to either pre-
pare an impact statement or consider alternatives. However, the Supreme Court noted
that NEPA duties were “essentially procedural” (1980, 227–228), citing Vermont Yankee,
and did not allow the court to substitute its decision for the agency’s. A court will usu-
ally refuse to substitute its judgment for that of the reviewing agency regarding how the
agency should have weighed the evidence in determining whether to issue permits (Isle
of Hope, etc. v. U.S. Army Corps 1981, 220). The issuance of a permit will not be disturbed
as long as the decision of the reviewing agency was not “arbitrary and capricious” (Sierra
Club v. Morton 1975, 818). If the evaluation conducted by the agency “makes sense,” is a
“reasoned decision,” and is founded on a “reasoned evaluation of the relevant factors,”
the agency’s decision will pass muster under the arbitrary and capricious test (Dubois v.
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 1997, 1235). “The court is not empowered to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency” (Citizens v. Volpe 1971, 467). With these standards of review
and the knowledge that a decision will be reversed only for a substantial procedural
error or a failure to comply with a statutory mandate, a review of the requirements of law
indicates that a court reversal is highly unlikely.
A review of federal rules and regulations regarding the EIA provides a laundry list
of topics that is required to be included in the EIA. The topics that are required to be
included in the EIA appear to be straightforward, and, according to statutory and regu-
latory authority, the EIA is required only to “address,” “assess,” and/or “consider” each
of these topics. Currently, even if the assessment by the agency is minimal, a court will
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
One of the most common challenges made to an agency’s decision is to attack the
sufficiency of the EIS prepared by the agency. Just as courts have adopted a hard look
test in reviewing an agency decision, a minority of courts has also adopted a similar test
when reviewing the adequacy of an EIS. The function of the federal court is only to
determine whether the plaintiff has established “by a preponderance of the evidence,
rather than by a prima facie showing of deficiencies that the EIS . . . was inadequate” (Isle
of Hope, etc. v. U.S. Army Corps 1981, 220). While aware that NEPA requires the EIS to
be a “detailed statement,” the court does not place “extreme or unrealistic burdens on
the compiling agency” (220). With these admitted limitations, the hard look test
appears to be hard in name only and not in its application.
A majority of courts have adopted a “rule of reason” standard that modifies or soft-
ens the hard look test with regard to the EIS. The rule of reason is used to determine the
adequacy of the impact statement.
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Regardless of the judicial review standard employed when reviewing the adequacy
of an EIS, the courts clearly consider their role in reviewing the EIS as strictly limited. As
long as the evaluation conducted by the agency “makes sense,” is a “reasoned decision,”
and is founded on a “reasoned evaluation of the relevant factors,” the agency’s decision
will pass muster under the arbitrary and capricious test (Dubois v. U.S. Department of Agri-
culture 1997, 1285). “The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency” (Citizens v. Volpe 1971, 402).
Concluding Remarks
Court decisions regarding NEPA, as implemented, configure as follows: First, the
courts are reluctant to overrule the judgment of the decision-making agency, whether it
has denied or granted an application for a license or included or not included certain
information. The courts have not been provided acceptable methodology, or analytical
technique for valuation or efficiency determination, upon which to base rejection. Sec-
ond, courts seem to be without a legitimate standard about which entity has the author-
ity to complete and assess environmental impact studies, in that courts have allowed
corporations that are the facility developers to review and assess the adequacy of their
own environmental analysis. Third, courts have stated that numerous alternative analy-
ses are acceptable—alternatives such as cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, cost-effec-
tiveness, network analyses, or simple lists of impacts. Fourth, it appears that the courts
will allow almost any kind of analysis that was worked upon in a diligent manner.
The acceptance of almost any kind of analysis that has the appearance of being
worked on in a diligent manner is a dream come true for large corporations. They have
plenty of funds to hire experts and consulting firms to give the appearance of diligence
on their own license applications and when assisting agencies in the preparation of the
EIA and EIS or when agencies allow the corporations to assess their own license applica-
tion. If a license decision is challenged in court by public groups, the large integrated
corporations have deep pockets to demonstrate in court that the work was done in a dili-
gent manner.
The current situation allows an opportunity for institutional economists to provide
methodology, modeling, and database development consistent with the holistic and
organic intent of NEPA. Such assistance would be welcomed by many government agen-
cies and public advocacy groups who are concerned about protecting the environment.
Institutional economics is consistent with the intent of NEPA. Equally important, such
a concerted effort by institutionalists would help challenge and constrain the undue
influence of corporations in government agencies.
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Notes
1. As used in this article, “institutional” refers to work in the tradition of the original institu-
tional economics (OIE), not the new institutional economics (NIE).
2. The “Greatest Generation” (from the book of the same name) in the United States is the gen-
eration that grew up during the Great Depression of the 1930s, fought in World War II in the
1940s, and (those who returned from the war) came home to build a prosperous economy
and establish legislation, government programs, nongovernmental agencies, and advocacy
organizations in order to provide for a good life for US citizens.
3. Institutional economists—from John R. Commons to Harry R. Trebing—have provided ana-
lytical frameworks for analysis in areas other than environmental assessment.
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